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5.1  Introduction 
Two  facts that  corporations,  underwriters,  and investors have been 
forced to confront are increased capital market volatility and increased 
complexity in the design of securities. A seemingly endless list of new se- 
curity ideas has compounded the already difficult problem of  making 
sound issuance, underwriting, and investment decisions in highly volatile 
markets.  However, these two  facts, increased volatility and  increased 
complexity, are not unrelated. Virtually all of the complexity in securities 
can be viewed as the inclusion of different options in a straight debt con- 
tract. Even such common debt features as call provisions and call protec- 
tion can be viewed as options. The value of a call provision is the value of 
an option to redeem debt at a fixed price prior to maturity, and the value 
of call protection is the value of  shortening the life of that option. Given 
the fact that the value of options is driven most significantly by volatility, 
the advantage of including options, that is, financial flexibility, in securi- 
ties has increased with increased market volatility. This would appear to 
explain why corporate issuers and institutional investors have shown sub- 
stantial interest  in securities which  improve their  flexibility in volatile 
markets. In low-volatility markets, corporations and investors would not 
lose a great deal of flexibility if options were excluded from the design of 
securities and would not make large valuation errors if  options were ig- 
nored in valuing securities. But given that options are more valuable in a 
volatile market, significant valuation errors could result  from ignoring 
options or valuing them through possibly outdated rules of thumb. There- 
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fore, techniques which can consistently reflect the role of volatility in the 
value of options or flexibility should be of interest to issuers, underwrit- 
ers, and investors. 
A major breakthrough in the valuation of  options came in 1973 when 
Fisher Black and Myron Scholes presented a technique for valuing calls 
and puts written on common stock. While their findings had an immedi- 
ate and significant impact on the stock option markets, Black and Scholes 
offered a qualitative insight which may prove of even greater practical sig- 
nificance  than their  famous quantitative  formula:  corporate liabilities 
and covenants can be viewed as combinations of simple option contracts. 
This generalization  of option pricing models to corporate securities and 
covenants became known as Contingent Claims Analysis (CCA). 
This paper summarizes the results of some research by Jones, Mason, 
and Rosenfeld (JMR) (1984) and presents some new results, which test the 
ability of  a CCA model based on Black and Scholes’s option pricing prin- 
ciples to predict the market price of callable corporate debt, and there- 
fore, the price of such common debt covenants as call provisions and call 
protection. This research had its origin in some earlier work (JMR 1983) 
done for the National Bureau’s conference on corporate capital structures 
in the United States. In addition, some numerical CCA results are reported 
which demonstrate the impact of changing interest rate volatility on the 
value of  call provisions  and call protection.  First, however,  the paper 
briefly reviews the basics of  option pricing and demonstrates the signifi- 
cance of option pricing to pricing corporate securities and individual cov- 
enants. 
5.2  Corporate Liabilities as Options’ 
To understand  the relationship between  corporate liabilities  and op- 
tions, consider first the most  fundamental options: calls and puts.  An 
American call option, whose price is denoted by C,  gives its owner the 
right to purchase an asset, for example, one share of stock, with current 
price S, at an exercise price, X, on or before an expiration date which is T 
time periods from now. The call option owner will only exercise his right 
to buy if it is to his advantage. Figure 5.1 depicts the value of the call op- 
tion as it depends on the stock price on the expiration date. Should the 
stock price on the expiration date be less than the exercise price, then the 
call option owner will not exercise his right to purchase the stock and the 
option will expire worthless, that is, C=  0. If, however, the stock price is 
greater than the exercise price, then the call option will be worth S-  X,  the 
difference between  the stock price and the exercise price.  An option is 
1. This section of the paper borrows from Mason and Merton (1989, which more fully de- 
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Fig. 5.1  Payoff to call option 
termed “American” if it can be exercised on or before the expiration date 
and “European” if it can be exercised only on the expiration date. 
Clearly, a call option pays off more the higher  the underlying stock 
price at expiration. If the volatility of the stock increases, then the prob- 
ability increases that the stock price will be higher at expiration. It is also 
true that an increase in volatility increases the probability that the stock 
price will be lower at expiration, but the effect of a lower stock price on 
the expected payoff to an option is bounded since the option holder has 
the right not to exercise-that  is, not to surrender the exercise price-if  it 
is not in his best interest. Therefore, increased volatility increases the ex- 
pected payoff to the option and increases the option’s value. 
An American put option, R gives its owner the right to  sell one share of 
stock, S, at an exercise price, X, on or before its expiration date Tperiods 
from now. Again, the put option owner will only exercise his right to  sell if 
it is to his advantage. Figure 5.2 depicts the value of the put option on its 
expiration date. If the stock price on the expiration date is greater than the 
exercise price, then the put option owner will not exercise his right to sell 
the stock and the put option will expire worthless, P=  0. However, should 
the stock price be less than the exercise price, then the put option owner 
will exercise his right to sell the stock and the put option will be worth 
X-  S, the difference between the exercise price and the stock price. The 
expected payoff to the put also increases given increased volatility since 
the probability  that the stock price will be lower increases and the put 94  Scott P. Mason 
Fig. 5.2  Payoff to put option 
owner need not exercise if it is not to his advantage, that is, if the stock 
price is above the exercise price. 
An important relationship between European call and put prices can be 
derived from figures 5.1 and 5.2. Consider buying a European call and 
selling a European put on the same stock, with the same exercise price and 
expiration date. The net investment is 
c -  p. 
The value of this investment position at expiration of the options is depicted 
in figure 5.3. The value of the investment position on the expiration date is 
S-X, the difference between the stock price and the exercise price. The 
investment can have negative value if the stock price is below the exercise 
price because the call will expire worthless and the put will be exercised 
against its seller. However, there is another investment position involving 
no options which can replicate the payoff depicted in figure 5.3. Consider 
buying one share of stock, S,  borrowing on a discount basis X dollars for 
Ttime periods at rate r, that is, the proceeds from the loan will beX(1 + 
r)-  Tallowing for discounting. This second investment is then 
S -  X(l +r)-T. 
In T periods the value of  this position will be S-X, since the position 
owns one share of stock and owes X dollars. But, if these two positions 
have precisely the same value in T time periods, then it must be true that 
the initial net investment necessary to establish the positions is the same: 
(1)  c -  p  = s -  X(l +r)-T. 95  Valuing Financial Flexibility 







Fig. 5.3  Payoff to investment position 
Expression (1) is known to professional traders as “put-call parity.” The 
expression simply says that prices in the call, put, stock, and lending mar- 
kets must be such that (1) is always true. If this were not the case, traders 
would simply buy the lower-priced alternative and sell the higher-priced 
alternative and earn an immediate riskless return on zero net investment. 
With these fundamental options properties as background, the corre- 
spondence between options and corporate liabilities can now be estab- 
lished. Consider figure 5.4, the economic balance sheet of a simple firm 
which has only two liabilities: equity, E, and a single issue of zero-coupon 
debt, 0,  where the equity receives no dividends and the firm will issue no 
new securities while the debt is outstanding. 
Fig. 5.4  Firm’s economic balance sheet 
The left-hand side of  the balance sheet represents the economic value, K 
of the firm. The right-hand side lists the economic value of  all the liabili- 
ties of the firm. 96  Scott P.  Mason 
Figures 5.5 and 5.6 depict the value of equity and risky debt as they de- 
pend on the value of  the firm on the maturity date of the debt. If, on the 
debt’s maturity  date, the value of the firm is greater than the promised 
principal, V > B, then the debt will be paid off, D = B, and the equity will 
be worth  V - B. However, if the value of the firm is less than the prom- 
ised principal,  V < B, then the equity will be worthless, E = 0, since it is 
preferable to surrender the firm to the debt holders, D = K than to  repay 
the  debt.  Both  equity  and risky  debt  are contingent  claims  securities 
whose value is contingent on the value of the firm. 
Now compare figures 5.1 and 5.5. Equity in the presence of zero-coupon 
risky debt is directly analogous to a European call option written on the 
firm value,  K with an exercise price, B, equal to the debt’s promised prin- 
cipal and an expiration date equal to the maturity date of the debt. In other 
words, equity can be viewed as a call option with the right to buy the firm 
for B dollars Ttime periods from now. 
Now return to the put-call parity result, (l), for options demonstrated 
earlier. In the characterization of corporate liabilities as options, the value 
of the firm, K is the underlying asset on which the options are written; the 
debt’s promised principal, B, is the exercise price; and the debt’s maturity 
date is the option’s expiration date. But since the value of the firm is the 
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Fig. 5.6  Payoff to debt 
and since the value of the equity is analogous to a call option written on 
the value of the firm, it then follows that 
D  = B(1 + r):; 
The value of risky debt is equal to the price of a risk-free bond with the 
same terms minus the price of a put written on the value of the firm. 
Expression (2) has an intuitive interpretation.  It is commonly under- 
stood that risky debt plus a loan guarantee has the same value as risk-free 
debt. The loan guarantee is like insurance, that is, it will pay any shortfall 
in the value of the firm necessary to fully repay the debt. Figure 5.7 de- 
picts the value of a loan guarantee, G, on the maturity date of the risky 
debt. If on the maturity date of the debt the value of the firm is greater 
than the debt’s promised principal, that is, V > B, then the guarantee will 
pay nothing since the firm is sufficiently valuable to retire the debt. How- 
ever, if the value of the firm is less than the promised principal,  V < B, 
then the guarantor must pay the difference between the promised princi- 
pal and the value of the firm, B -  K in order that the debt be fully repaid. 
Now compare figures 5.2 and 5.7.  It is evident that a loan guarantee is 
analogous to a European put option written on the value of the firm, that 
is, G = p.  And, therefore, expression (2) is simply the statement that risky 
debt plus a loan guarantee is equal to a risk-free bond. 
The characterization of corporate liabilities as options goes much deeper 
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that the debt receives coupon payments. Then equity can be thought of as 
analogous to a European call option on  a dividend-paying stock where the 
coupon payments are the “dividends.”  Now assume the coupon bond is 
callable under a schedule of  prices. The equity is now analogous to an 
American call option on a dividend-paying stock where the exercise price 
changes according to the specified schedule. Furthermore, the value of the 
call provision can be characterized as the difference between the value of 
an American and a European call option where the exercise price changes 
according to the specified schedule. The value of  call protection against 
redemption for the first T, c  T time periods can be viewed as the differ- 
ence between the values of two American call options on a dividend-paying 
stock where the first call can be exercised at any time according to a sched- 
ule and the second call can only be exercised in the last T - T,  time peri- 
ods. As is evident from these examples, the correspondence between cor- 
porate liabilities and options extends to a wide variety of securities and 
covenants. 
As shown, equity, zero-coupon debt, and loan guarantees can be repre- 
sented as combinations of  simple option contracts. The correspondence 
is, moreover, sufficiently complete that it is possible to  characterize many 
of the complex securities and covenants encountered in practice by similar 99  Valuing Financial Flexibility 
analogies to basic options. Note that this correspondence is not dependent 
upon any particular option pricing model, but instead is a fundamental 
relationship which must hold independently of how options and corpo- 
rate securities are assumed to be priced. Therefore, given any option pric- 
ing model with all its direct implications  for pricing stock options, that 
same model has corresponding direct implications for the pricing of cor- 
porate liabilities and covenants. 
The traditional approach to the pricing of different corporate liabilities 
and covenants employs different valuation techniques and rules of thumb 
for different problems, and rarely attempts to integrate the various com- 
ponents of the firm’s capital structure as even a check on the internal con- 
sistency of these diverse valuation methodologies.  In contrast, the CCA 
approach to the pricing of corporate liabilities and covenants begins with 
the firm’s total capital structure and uses a single evaluation technique to 
price each of the individual components of that structure simultaneously. 
Thus, the CCA methodology takes into account the interactive effects of 
each of the securities on the prices of all the others and ensures a consis- 
tent evaluation procedure for the entire capital structure. 
5.3  Call Provisions and Call Protection 
JMR (1984, 1985) test the ability of a CCA model based on the option 
pricing principles of Black and Scholes (1973) to  predict the prices of mul- 
tiple issues of callable coupon debt subject to sinking funds. The test not 
only accounted for all the debt covenants present but also recognized the 
interactions  among the different  issues in multiple  bond  capital  struc- 
tures. Data were collected for 27 firms on a monthly basis from January 
1975 through January 1981 when possible.  The firms were selected ac- 
cording to a number of criteria at the beginning of 1975: (1) simple capital 
structure (i.e.,  one class of stock, no convertible bonds, small number of 
debt issues, no preferred stock); (2) small proportion of private debt to  to- 
tal capital; (3) small proportion of short-term notes payable or capitalized 
leases to  total capital; and (4) all publicly traded debt is rated. 
Based on these criteria the following firms were selected: 
Firm  Bond Rating Range  Firm  Bond Rating Range 
Allied Chemical  AALA  Cities Service  A 
Anheuser Busch  A  CPC  AA/A 
Braniff  BBB/CC  Crane  BBB 
Brown Group  A  Food Fair  BB/B 
Bucyrus Erie  A  Fuqua  B 
Champion Spark  AA  General Cigar  BB/B 
Plug  Kane Miller  B 100  Scott P. Mason 
~~ 
Firm  Bond Rating Range  Firm  Bond Rating Range 
MGM  BBB/B  Republic Steel  A 
National Tea  B  Seagram  A 
NVF  B  Sunbeam  A 
Proctor & Gamble  AAA  Tandy  BBB/BB 
Pullman  BBB  United Brands  B 
Rapid American  B/CCC  Upjohn  AA 
Raytheon  AA/A  Whit taker  BB/B 
CCA requires three kinds of data to solve for prices of individual claims 
as functions of total firm value: (1) indenture data, (2) business risk data, 
and (3) interest rate data. For example, the following data were collected 
for each bond for each firm: principal, coupon rate, call price schedule, 
call protection period, sinking fund payments, seniority, and options to 
sink  at market  or par.  The bond  covenant  data were  collected  from 
Moody’s Bond Guide, except that sinking fund payments were collected 
from the monthly S&P Bond Guide. For purposes of  testing the model, 
actual bond prices were also collected from the latter source. Business risk 
was estimated by measuring the volatility of the firm’s equity returns and 
adjusting these estimates in a manner consistent with the CCA model and 
the observed leverage of the firm. Lastly, it was assumed that the future 
course of the 1-year rate of  interest is known and is consistent with the 
1-year forward interest rates implied by the current term structure. 
Tables 5.1-5.3  summarize the results. Percentage error is defined as the 
predicted price minus the actual price divided by the actual price. Abso- 
lute percentage errors and results from a naive model are also reported. 
The naive model essentially assumes that the value of the firm is suffi- 
’Igble 5.1  Pricing Results and Comparisons: CCA Model and Naive (Risk- 
less) Model (Standard Deviations in Wrentheses) 
Mean 
Mean  Absolute 
Percentage Error  Percentage  Error 
Number 
of Bonds  CCA Model  Naive Model  CCA Model  Naive Model  Overall Results 
Entire sample  305  ,0452  .0876  .0845  .I143 
(.1003)  (.1441)  (.1705)  (.1240) 
Investment grade  176  .0047  ,0149  ,0587  ,0574 
(.0727)  (.0703)  (.0432)  (.0432) 
Noninvestment grade  129  .lo05  .I867  .I197  .I919 
(.1063)  (.1590)  (.0840)  (.  1528) 101  Valuing Financial Flexibility 
Table 5.2  Individual Firm Results: CCA Model and Naive (Riskless) Model 
(Standard Deviations in Parentheses) 
Firm 
Mean 
Mean  Absolute 
Percentage Deviation  Percentage Error 
Number 
of  Bonds  CCA Model  Naive Model  CCA Model  Naive Model 
Allied Chemical  20 
Anheuser Busch  20 
Branif€  20 
Brown Group  11 
Bucyrus Erie  10 
Champion Spark Plug  5 
Cities Service  10 
CPC  10 
Crane  17 
Food Fair  4 
Fuqua  22 
General Cigar  5 
Kane Miller  5 
MGM  26 
National Tea  3 
NVF  6 
Procter & Gamble  15 
Pullman  4 
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Tpble 5.2  (continued) 
Mean 
Mean  Absolute 
Percentage Deviation  Percentage Error 
Firm 
Number 
of Bonds  CCA Model  Naive Model  CCA Model  Naive Model 
Raytheon  5  .0245  .023  1  .0824  .0805 
Republic Steel  10  -.0231  .0238  .0565  .0273 
(.0%2)  (.0959)  (.OW?)  (.0571) 
(.0647)  (.0348)  (.0391)  (.0322) 
Seagram  9  .0419 
(.0283) 
Sunbeam  5  -.0653 
(.05 13) 
11  .0510 
(.0951) 
United Brands  12  .1302 
(.1423) 
Upjohn  3  .0139 
(.0258) 
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ciently large to make all debt riskless. These results were obtained from 
the same runs of  the model that produced the CCA estimates. Thus the 
naive model prices simply reflect the magnitude and timing of promised 
payments discounted back by the risk-free interest rates, plus the effects 
of the call provision and the sinking fund option to sink at the minimum 
of par or market. Incrementally, the CCA model prices attempt to capture 
the risk of default through the consideration of business risk and financial 
risk, that is, finite firm value relative to promised payouts. In addition, 
the CCA model introduces the distinction between senior and junior debt 
as well as the presence of equity which complicates (relative to the naive 
model) the optimal call policy. 
Table 5.1 presents the pricing errors for the CCA and the naive model. 
Results are reported for investment-grade (bond rating of BBB or higher) 
and non-investment-grade subsamples as well as the entire sample. As is 
evident from inspection, the CCA and naive models are virtually indistin- 
guishable for investment grade bonds. This can be interpreted as evidence 
that default risk is not playing a significant role in explaining investment- 
grade bond prices. This also suggests that a stochastic interest rate model 
could be a better predictor of investment-grade bond prices and therefore 
a better predictor of the value of call provisions and call protection. There 103  Valuing Financial Flexibility 
Table 5.3  Pricing Results and Comparisons by Year:  CCA Model and Naive 
(Riskless) Model (Standard Deviations in Parentheses) 
Year 
Mean 
Mean  Absolute 
Percentage Error  Percentage Error 
Number 
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do  appear to  be significant differences between the CCA and naive models 
for non-investment-grade  bonds where default risk is undoubtedly play- 
ing a large role. 
Tables 5.2 and 5.3,  which present the results by firm and year, respec- 
tively, suggest that the valuation errors could be firm and year specific. A 
firm effect could be induced by a specific bond effect, that is, the fact that 
a specific bond is underpriced in one year increases the probability it will 
be underpriced in other years. A firm effect could also be induced by a sys- 
tematic bias in the estimate of the business risk of the firm, that is, a sys- 
tematic overestimate of business risk will lead to systematic underpricing 
of bonds for that firm. A year effect could be induced by the nonstochas- 
tic interest rate assumption. Table 5.3 suggests that the year effect is stron- 
ger for investment grade bonds, which is consistent with viewing interest 
rates as the major source of uncertainty for this set of bonds. Lastly, this 
test of the CCA model assumed symmetric tax treatment  for corporate 
bonds which undoubtedly  explains the model’s tendency to undervalue 
discount bonds. 
One of the reasons the CCA model tested by JMR (1 984) does not do a 
better job of predicting callable debt prices is that the model uses the value 
of the firm as the source of volatility, that is, default risk. As practitioners 
well understand, it has been the increased volatility of interest rates, not 
firm value, which has contributed most substantially to the overall volatil- 
ity of the market. It is possible to recast the CCA model, following Cox et al. 
(1984), such that the source of uncertainty driving the value of such com- 
mon debt covenants as call provision and call protection is interest rate 
risk, not default risk. Tables 5.4 and 5.5 present some CCA numeric re- 
2. See Jones et al. (1984, 1985) for a more complete treatment of the differences between 
the CCA and naive models. 105  Valuing Financial Flexibility 
Pble  5.5  Value of  Call Provialon  and Call Protection: Rising Term  Strpctare 
Interest Rate  Bond  Par Bond 
Volatility  Description  Coupon 
Low  Noncallable  11.50 
Low  Callable after  11.50 
7 years @ 100 
6 years @ 100 
Low  Callable after  11.50 
High  Noncallable  10.31 
High  Callable after  10.93 
High  Callable after  11.25 
7 years @ 100 
6 years @ 100 
sults for the value of a call provision and call protection on a risk-free 
bond in both a rising and a falling term structure environment. In each 
case it is assumed that the short-term interest rate is 10% and the bond’s 
maturity is 10 years. In table 5.4 the term structure is assumed to be fall- 
ing, with long rates at the 6% level. When interest rates have low volatil- 
ity,  the CCA model computes the coupon  on the  10-year par bond  at 
8.625%.  The value of the particular  call provision considered, callable 
after 7 years at 100, is computed at 43.5 basis points (906-  862.5).  One 
less year of  call protection is shown to have no value. When interest rates 
have high volatility, the CCA model computes the coupon on the 10-year 
bond as 7.875%  and the value of the call provision as 87.5 basis points. 
One less year of call protection is calculated as having the value of 35 addi- 
tional basis points. 
Table 5.5 shows the same calculations when the term structure is rising, 
that is, long rates at the 15% level and the short rate at 10%.  Here, logically 
enough, the value of the call provision and call protection is less given the 
upward-sloping term structure. In fact, for low volatility, the CCA model 
shows these provisions to have no value. In the high-volatility case, while 
there is some reduction in value due to the rising term structure, it is not 
significant. The value of the call provisions is 62 basis points and the value 
of one more year of call protection is 32 basis points. This underscores the 
relative importance of volatility versus the shape of  the term structure, 
that is, expectations, in valuing call provisions and call protection. 
5.4  Conclusion 
Increased capital market volatility has increased the value of any finan- 
cial flexibility built into the design of  securities. The options-based CCA 
approach to valuing financial flexibility holds forth the potential of not 
only valuing a wide range of  covenants but also accounting for the inter- 106  Scott P. Mason 
action of various securities and covenants within a capital structure. As is 
evident from the empirical work of JMR (1984,  1985) the application of 
CCA to complex capital structures is still in the development stages. How- 
ever, CCA techniques are being used to help value individual covenants as 
demonstrated  with the reported numeric analysis of call provisions and 
call protection. In addition, CCA is being used to value such new forms of 
financial flexibility as debt with  warrants  to purchase additional  debt, 
puttable debt, and extendable debt. Various forms of equity-linked debt, 
for example, convertible debt, units of debt with warrants, exchangeable 
debt, and exchangeable units of debt with warrants, are also being valued 
using CCA techniques. While CCA is more complex than traditional valu- 
ation techniques, it more correctly incorporates the interactions of multi- 
ple securities and covenants and the role of volatility in the valuation of fi- 
nancial flexibility. As markets become more volatile and securities more 
complex, interest in correctly valuing financial flexibility should also in- 
crease. 
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